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Abstract— With ever advancing in digital system, security 
has been emerged as a major concern. Many researchers all 
around the world come up with solutions to address various 
challenges that are crucial for industry and market. The aim of 
this survey is a brief review of challenges of security validation 
as well as define and classify Hardware Trojans. Then, we 
provide more details about various validation techniques for 
hardware security and trust. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION  
Secure designing and removing vulnerabilities of a design are 
becoming a major concern in the semiconductor industry. We 
are observing the growing computing platforms in many areas 
such as smart cards, financial systems and many Internet of 
Thing (IoT) devices. These are high-risk applications of 
computing that need a lot of attentions to enhance their secure 
platforms. Due to following reasons the demand for providing 
security solutions has been drastically increased and virtually 
all companies are trying to meliorate security assurance [42]. 
 
Increasing skills and resources of adversaries: Nowadays, we 
can observe many attacks that have been launched for 
economic or political reasons with novel approaches. For 
example, Stuxnet worm cause the leak of sensitive information 
from a specific nation state [45]. 
 
Increasing attacks in hardware-oriented: Previously, 
adversaries attack a system by targeting only software 
components in a way that get privileges for executing a 
malevolent code [43]. In the recent years, there is large trends 
toward hardware security with the aim of opening backdoor to 
simplify bypassing of protection mechanisms by operating 
systems [44]. Furthermore, detection of malicious circuit is 
very hard and their harms to circuit are considerable [42]. 
Besides, by concerning time to market, System-on-chip (SoC) 
designers make use of Intellectual Properties (IPs) to expedite 
the production process. However, these IPs are from all over 
the world and hence they are not trusted. Therefore, security 
validation is an essential need for the IPs itself.  
 
Hardware Trojans (HTs) are malicious circuits that are added 
to design by adversaries to extract the valuable information or 
defeat the trustworthiness of design or modify the functionality 
of the design. Figure 1 shows electronic supply chain security 
model. As you can observe, HT can be added in almost all 
stages including, specification, IP integration, implementation, 
synthesis, physical design, manufacturing, etc. However, the 
attackers tend to add HTs in the design stage or IP integration 
rather than in fabrication phase since they don’t need to access 
foundry facilities to insert HTs [51]. 
In this survey, we are going to study the various challenges and 
solution of trust validation. The remaining part of the article is 
arranged as follows. Section II expresses validation importance 
in VLSI design cycle. Section III is about security validation 
challenges with functional design approaches. Section IV 
explains different classes of hardware Trojans. Section V is the 
main part of the paper and reviews verification techniques for 
hardware trust whereas Section VI concludes the paper.   
 
Figure 1-Electronic supply chain security model [47]. 
II. VALIDATION IMPOTANCE 
Validation means to be sure that the design implementation 
satisfies design specification requirements. Diagnosis and 
correction mean scrutinizing an implementation to find errors 
and remove them while it is correspondent to the specification 
respectively [1]. With the ever-increasing of digital system 
complexity, the specific properties of the design are growing 
and some corner cases and unreachable states are becoming 
more than ever. Hence verification and validation of systems is 
an important and challenging task while about 60% of design 
effort is dedicated to design verification [1][2].  
The validation approach can be categorized into formal 
(static) [3], semi-formal [4] and simulation (dynamic) methods 
[5].  
The formal methods are based on mathematical features 
and can be classified in theorem proving, equivalence checking 
and property (model) checking.  The advantage of using this 
method is high coverage. Thus, one can assure that all possible 
situations have been verified. Nevertheless, they are complex, 
and generally non-user friendly. Besides, it is difficult to 
provide mathematical model for all designs especially for large 
one [3].  
The simulation mechanisms are based on input-output data 
and comparing the output results with expected ones. These 
approaches are easy to use, have low cost and can be used for 
verification of large designs. However, their error coverage is 
low. Hence, some errors may be skipped in verification phase 
[4].  
In the semi-formal approaches, it is tried to make use of the 
advantage of both formal and simulation-based methods. They 
can be categorized in assertion-, coverage- and symbolic 
simulation-based methods [1]. 
 In the last decades, several new mechanisms such as 
modern decision diagrams [5][6][7], abstraction [8], 
satisfiability at binary level [9][10][11], satisfiability modulo 
theory [12], and bounded model checking [13] have been 
emerged.  There are also some trends in using mutation [14], 
symbolic algebra [15], and probabilistic approaches [16] in 
verification, debugging and correction phases. 
III. SECURITY VALIDATION CHALLENGES 
In Security validation like design validation, the goal is 
investigating some specific properties of a system (e.g. in this 
case the security properties). However, there are several 
challenges that cause we cannot make use of design validation 
techniques directly [17].  
The first challenge is that vulnerabilities or Trojans 
may hardly change the functionality of systems. Therefore, 
direct using of functional verification technique is not useful at 
all [18].  The second issue is that some Trojan can be activated 
because of component interactions. Accordingly, unlike 
design verification, security validation may be postponed until 
all components are integrated together. The third issue is that 
defining properties for security issues is not straightforward. 
Converting security statements into exact requirements needs   
expertise in design verification and security domain [19]. The 
final point is that in the security validation we do not have 
specific model and well-defined criteria. Consequently, it is 
not possible to decide that existing test cases [50] are enough 
or not [17]. Moreover, there are some trade-off between 
debugging and security issues. While more observability is 
advantageous for debugging purpose, it is not suitable for 
security. 
 
To overcome these problems, several solutions have 
been proposed. One of the efficient way for security 
amelioration is to begin the execution of Secure Development 
Lifecycle (SDL) as early as possible. In this manner, one can 
solve resource conflicts that effect test environment 
implementation and improve threat models. Pay attention that 
with limited resources one cannot cover all test cases. 
Therefore, some changes that effect on device security 
objectives can be identified [17]. 
  One of the efficient way for utilizing functional 
validation for security trust and validation is fuzzing or 
random input testing methods [20]. Fuzzing method is to some 
extent similar to constraint testing. However, there are few 
discrepancies between fuzzing and constrained random 
testing. Fuzzing testing methods try to apply unexpected 
inputs in various methods, while constrained testing strategies 
may overlook such inputs altogether. It has been proved that 
by combining protocol knowledge, mutation and randomness, 
fuzzing approach is an efficient way in discovering 
vulnerabilities in both software and hardware [20]. Besides, 
they are easy to implement with a little overhead. By 
weighting the valid and invalid inputs and adjusting them, one 
can enhance coverage and efficiency of them in detecting 
vulnerabilities [17]. 
Static analysis approaches are recommended in 
design validation methods. Compromised firmware that is 
patched to systems imposes important security risks. In this 
situation, we can make use of static analysis tools for all 
firmware with access to system resources to reduce the risk of 
security issues [21].  
 
IV. HARDWARE TROJAN CLASSIFICATION 
Hardware Trojans are composed of trigger 
(activation mechanism) and payload (malicious 
function). The input of trigger functions is hardly 
activated; so, it is difficult for test cases to detect 
hardware Trojans. In one perspective, Trojans can be 
classified in two categories: The first type is 
combinational Trojans and the second one is sequential 
ones. If the Trojan is activated based on specific 
condition or internal signals or flip-flops, it is called 
combinational Trojans. However, in sequential ones, the 
Trojans are stimulated based on specific FSM that are 
activated when a sequence is provided. You can see the 
differences in Figure 2.  
In another perspective, Hardware Trojans can be 
grouped based on their effect on the normal functionality 
of a design. If it directly changes the normal outputs, it is 
called bug-based HT. However, if it does not have any 
impact on the normal functionality, but add some extra 
logic along with original design it is called parasite-
based HT [22]. 
 
Figure 2-Different Types of Trojans [29]. 
 
Figure 3 and 4 show HT classification in both circuit 
structure and K-Map structure.  Figure 3(a) depicts the 
normal circuit whereas Figure 3(b) sketches the circuit 
while an attacker may convert the original circuit to a 
malicious one by adding an inverter on the d1 as an 
input. In this case d1 can serves as original and trigger 
input. In general, they are not suitable for attacker since 
they can be detected easily in design verification stage. 
Hence, almost all HTs in designs are parasite-based type. 
Suppose that an attacker wants to add the former 
malicious circuit fm into design while the original one is 
fn. To do so, he can add the trigger function t1t2 and 
control when the malicious circuit is going to be 
activated Figure 3(c). Figure 4(a) to Figure 4(d) show the 
corresponding K-Map of circuits in Figure 3(a) [22]. 
Figure 3- HT classification in both circuit. (a) original circuit, (b) Bug 
based type, (c) parasite based type while trigger condition is {t1, t2} = 
{1,1} [37] 
 
 
Figure 4- K-Map Model od circuits in Figure 3. (a) for original circuit, 
(b) for Bug-based type, (c) for parasite-based type, (d) setting the third 
row of (c) as don’t care [37] 
V. VERIFICATION TECHNIQUES FOR HARWARE TRSUT 
Generally, there are there categories for validation of 
hardware trust. They are functional, formal and trust 
verification approaches [51, 22]. The third one is a new 
category which has different names in the literature and 
it is taken from the work in [22]. Each of these 
categories has several sub-categories. Figure 5 shows 
these categories in detail. In the following subsections, 
we review each of them in more details.  
Validation of Hardware Trust
Functional Verification Formal Verification Trust Verification
Equivalence 
Checking
Model Checking
Theorem Proving
Dynamic
Static
 
Figure 5- Classification of hardware trust validations [22] 
A. Functional (Simulation-based) Verifcation 
Hardware Trojan in functional (Simulation-based) verification 
can be distinguished by galvanizing and monitoring in the 
functional verification stage. However, as mentioned in 
Section IV, this method works for bug based hardware Trojan. 
For parasite type, this method rarely works if not possible 
[22]. Automatic Test Pattern Generation (ATPG) and Code 
Coverage can be utilized for distinguishing circuit with small 
Trojan and circuits without them. The effective test patterns 
for finding parasite trojans are hard to generate. The authors in 
[28] suggested a method to localize HT in four steps. First, 
The ATPG is used for catching easy-to-detect signals. 
Afterwards, a full scan N-detect ATPG is used to identify 
hardly activated nodes and finding suspicious circuits. At that 
point, a SAT solver is exploited to diminish the search space 
of mistrustful nodes.  In the last step, the gates that are not 
covered are grouped by region separation approach to discover 
HTs. This method needs a golden netlist and due to using SAT 
mechanism is not scalable enough [51]. 
A statistical approach technique called MERO in [29] 
engender test patterns to trigger rare nodes several times 
(Figure 6). In this manner, they can enhance the chance of 
activation. Accordingly, the Trojan detection chance can be 
increased. Nevertheless, they don’t consider payload role and 
hence the effect of trigger can be masked. To solve this 
problem, the authors in [30] suggest a solution that exploit 
genetic algorithm to create test cases that propagate the impact 
of  HT to primary outputs. Then, an ATPG is employed to 
discover activation patterns of the dormant hardware Trojans. 
Finally, a code coverage analysis over IPs is performed to 
detect corner cases in design that can be used as backdoor for 
adversaries and attackers. Though, HT may still remain in 
design while we have 100% code coverage. The authors in 
[31] make use of code coverage along with formal 
verification. If they fail to distinguish HT, other rules are 
exploited to discover unused and redundant circuits. 
 
Figure 6- Overview of MERO Approach [29]. 
B. Formal verification 
The limitations of functional testing methods in coverage 
has led to emerging formal methods [23]. In some work such 
as [24, 25, 27] the advantages of formal approaches over 
testing methods in exhaustive security have been demonstrated 
carefully. In the following subsections, we review main 
categories of formal verification for security purpose. 
B.1- Trojan Detection using Equivalence Checking 
Equivalence checking is one of the approaches in formal 
verification [46, 49]. By using this approach, one can make 
sure two aspects of a design (i.e. specification and 
implementation) behave similarly.  
Figure 7 illustrates a big picture for performing equivalence 
checking by making use of equivalence checker (e.g. SAT 
solver). The outputs of two different designs are XORed, then 
the output of XORs are Ored. Then Conjunctive Normal Form 
clauses (CNF) of the whole design are passed to a SAT solver. 
If the implementation and the specification are same, the final 
output is zero, otherwise one.  
 
 
Figure 7- Equivalence checking Mechanism [5] 
 
 
B.2- Trojan Detection using Theorem Proving 
Theorem proving is one of the powerful but non-user friendly 
approaches in formal verification. Many theorem provers have 
been introduced for hardware and software issues from 1960 
up to now [23]. One of recent theorem provers is Proof-
Carrying Hardware platform (PCH) that is developed for trust 
validation of soft IPs [33-34]. The core of this solution is based 
on Proof-Carrying Code (PCC) [32]. By making use of the 
PCC approach, software developers can certify their software 
Code. Then, developers can provide PCC binary file with a 
formal approach. The run time of this method is short and it 
has compatibility with different applications. Authors in [33–
35] proposed the PCH platform for dynamically 
reconfigurable runtime combinational equivalence checking. 
This method can be used for RTL and netlist validation. 
Figure 8 shows the details of this procedure. 
C. Trust Verification 
Untrusted circuit can be recognized by trust verification. 
The approach is established using the fact that HTs are hardly 
activated. This identification can be performed by detecting 
unsensitized paths within verification stage in dynamic manner 
such as UCI [36] and VeriTrust [37] or Boolean functional 
analysis statically such as FANCI [38].  
 
 
Figure 8-Overview of PCH platform [34] 
 
D.1 Unused Circuit Identification (UCI) 
The author of UCI proposed a defensive strategy called 
BlueChip that works design-time as well as runtime. During 
the design validation, they identify unused circuit that are 
potential locations for malicious circuits.  The UCI builds a 
flow graph from the circuit and defines the direct and indirect 
signal pairs. This pairs are equal when there are not any 
trigger situations [39].  Afterwards, it verifies the circuit to 
locate unemployed parts (e.g. parts of the design that do not 
effect on the primary outputs). BlueChip eliminates these 
circuits and substitutes them. Figure 9 demonstrate a big 
picture of BlueChip architecture. 
 
 
Figure 9- Overview of BlueChip mechanism [36] 
D.2 VeriTrust 
Figure 10 shows the big picture of VeriTrust work [37]. The 
tracer tracks verification test cases to recognize those signals 
that comprise non-activated entries of design functionality (i.e. 
entries of K-Map). The desired signals for tracking are outputs 
and the inputs of flip-flops. 
 
Figure 10- Big picture of  VeriTrust Solution 
 
As you can observe in the third row in K-Map in Figure 4 (c). 
shows the malicious function. When we compare the K-Map of 
the clean circuit and Trojan inserted circuit we can figure out 
that the hardware Trojans increases the size of K-Map when 
the number of inputs is increased. Accordingly, the circuit can 
exhibit the normal and malicious behavior that are controlled 
by trigger inputs. Uncovered entries are set as don’t care values 
to detect excessive inputs and hence potential location of 
hardware Trojans (Fig. 4(d)). By following digital logic rules, 
one can get the original cinputs (d1d2). Consequently, the 
trigger inputs, t1 and t2, are redundant. 
The main advantage of VeriTrust is that VeriTrust is not 
sensitive to the way of implementation of hardware Trojans. 
Nevertheless, DeTrust [40] introduces a new Trojan type in a 
way gates are governed using a subset of primary inputs and 
trigger conditions occurs across several clock cycles that 
VeriTrust cannot detect them. 
 
D.3 FANCI 
The author of FANCI [38] propose a novel solution to 
recognize the unused circuits using their Boolean functions and 
their values. They make use of the assumption that unused 
circuits are suitable location for inserting HTs. They make an 
approximate truth table for internal signals to figure out their 
impact on outputs. They exploit a predefined threshold for 
trigger conditions. All signals with lower stimulation than the 
computed threshold are mistrustful parts. They recommend 
multiple heuristics algorithms to define backdoors from control 
value vectors. A main feature of FANCI is that it does not rest 
on validation result. Furthermore, FANCI is not stalled by 
noncomplete tests and accordingly works without false 
negatives [22]. The disadvantage of this method is that several 
gates in design can be announced as safe gates inaccurately 
(false positives). For example, In DeTrust [40] the probability 
of the activation new Trojan types is higher than threshold 
value and hence FANCI considers them as non-malicious gates 
which is not true. On the other hand, if the circuit is 
trustworthy, there is chance that some gates are defined as 
suspicious functions in accurately.  
 
 Table 1-Characteristics of functional and Trust Verification for Hardware Trojan Detection [22] 
D. Discussion 
Table 1 reviews and compares the characteristics of the 
functional and trust verification.  The UCI [36] and VeriTrsut 
[37] are complement solutions for dynamic trust validation. 
With growing quantity of test vectors, the possibility of 
hardware Trojan activation is increased. Accordingly, the 
quantity of potential untrusted designs detected by these two 
approaches is decreased. Since the FANCI [38] is a static 
solution, the attacker could examine their Trojans by exploiting 
FANCI approach without any hypothesis of the unknown test 
vectors that in practical is used to detect Hardware Trojans 
[22].  
All trust validation methods try to minimize false positive 
and remove false negative as much as possible. However, the 
amount of detection can be affected by input and user specific 
parameters and inputs. For example, if the number of test cases 
is reduced, UCI and VeriTrust report many Hardware Trojan 
signals which is not necessarily true (false positive). Besides, 
FANCI make use of a threshold value for Trojan detection. If 
the value of threshold is small, there is chance that some HT-
related wires are missed. However, if it is large, it is likely that 
it detects many safe gates as suspicious ones.  
 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Defining and mitigating security vulnerabilities and Trojans in 
today’s complex designs are a complex tasks and important 
concerns. Current state of the art procedures have not 
addressed all the existing challenges. Hence, adversaries 
exploit the backdoors to steal valuable information or deviate 
the function of designs. This survey presents the concept and 
different classes of Hardware Trojans.  It also presents the 
challenges of using design validation technique for security 
purposes. Then, it reviews different strategies for security 
validation including functional, formal and trust validation. 
Especially, it expresses and compares three major works in 
trust verification including UCI, VeriTrust and FANCI. 
Although the current valuable approaches have solved some 
challenge of security validation, there are a lot of problems 
which need huge efforts to solve the security concerns in 
various aspects. 
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